What simulations can teach
STEVE PETRICK WRITES: Simulations can teach lessons if you keep your eyes open.
For leaders, they can re-affirm that there are reasons why things are done, and why chance is an eternal foe named Murphy.
When I was in college, I was involved in a gaming group that played miniatures every month or so. Within that group, I gained something of a reputation as not being very good on the offense, not knowing how to handle cavalry very well, but a solid commander of Infantry formations, and a nightmare to attack.
One of the last games I played was a simulation of Waterloo. My position was on the Ally's Right Flank. My job was to keep the French from getting over the high ground behind the farm (La Hay Sante if I recall correctly). But Wellington (the person playing him at any rate) decided to conduct an "economy of force" operation there. To that date, no attacker over six years of play had ever taken a position from me. Sometimes there was nothing left on my side at the end of the battle, but the enemy would not succeed in taking the position. So Wellington allocated just four battalions of Foot, and a few companies of riflemen to my sector. These would begin the battle with one battalion in the farm, the rifle companies in the sandpits to the left of the farm (as I looked at the battlefield), and my remaining three battalions arrayed on the rise well back from the farm.
Napoleon (the player playing him) allocated six battalions of foot, two regiments of Cuirassiers, and three batteries to the sector.
Observing the situation, I immediately started one of my three battalions on the heights down the slope to reinforce the farm.
The French began bombarding the farm, and simply annihilated the rifle companies in the pits (there was nothing I could do about it, that was where they started).
The bombardment of the farm was so fierce, that the troops there were driven to cover, i.e., the farm was "suppressed".
With this accomplishment, the two cuirassier regiments rode around the farm and threatened to charge the battalion marching to reinforce it. This forced the battalion to halt its advance and form square.
With the farm suppressed, the French infantry now advanced, with five battalions bypassing the farm on the Right (as I looked at it), intending to destroy the battalion trapped in square, while the sixth battalion turned to attack and take the farm (outnumbering the survivors of the battalion there two-to-one).
Since the farm was suppressed, and about to be stormed and taken by the sixth battalion, the other five battalions, advancing in a single dense column on a five battalion front, did not bother to deploy screening forces between themselves and the farm. Victory was assured; the British forces would be defeated in detail by the French masses. The farm could not stand before the assault, the battalion held in square could not retreat for fear of being overrun by the Cuirassiers, and could not remain in square or they would be annihilated by the advancing French Infantry. The two British battalions at the top of the rise could not intervene in what was about to happen.
As the three French batteries limbered up to follow the advance, couriers were dispatched to Napoleon by the French General-de-Division commanding the sector to announce his victory, and that he would soon be rolling up the Allied Right Flank.
At that juncture, as the French 6th Battalion started mounting the walls of the farm, the Garrison badly shot up as it was, counter-attacked. Met by screaming British soldiers at the walls, the 6th Battalion recoiled back on itself, its formation shattered, and the men broke fleeing desperately to the rear. The Garrison now lined the wall facing south (towards the advancing French infantry column), and unleashed disciplined platoon volleys into the exposed flank. As some officers and non-commissioned officers tried to keep the column moving, others tried to deploy against the fire from the farm. Confusion spreading through the column at this sudden turn of events led to panic, and the entire column collapsed into a disorganized mob running pel-mel back where they had come from. The just limbered guns and their crews were swept along in the panic-stricken retreat.
The French Cuirassiers suddenly found themselves exposed to their left rear to a suddenly active Allied Defense position. If they held their position, threatening the one British battalion, fire from the farm would cut them to pieces. If they charged, they would not break the square and would sustain losses to no good purpose. While not broken on morale like the foot and guns were, the Cuirassiers had no choice but to fall back.
The British Square reformed into column and marched down, reinforcing the farm, and one of the two remaining British Battalions at the top of the rise began its own march down to the farm. (The farm could only hold one and a half battalions of troops at a time. It was probable that by the time this battalion arrived, assuming the French could get reorganized, casualties from bombardment would once again have made room for the extra troops, as they had for the first battalion that had started marching when the battle began).
As a final statement that the position had been held, a platoon of British Light Troops was sent out from the farm to reoccupy the untenable sandpits.
The lesson learned?
Had the French Commander deployed a screen of skirmishers to protect the flank of his five battalion column, even had the French 6th Battalion routed like it did, he would have had time to deploy another battalion to take the farm. His assumption that the farm not only must fall, but also would fall to the 6th battalion, invited brother Murphy to visit him and Murphy did so with a vengeance. It simply never occurred to him that the garrison would counterattack, which in turn forced a morale check, or that it would be the 6th battalion that had to make that check, and would fail it catastrophically. By not taking a rudimentary precaution, he allowed an aggressive defender to seize an opportunity, which initiated the subsequent catastrophic chain of events.
For leaders, they can re-affirm that there are reasons why things are done, and why chance is an eternal foe named Murphy.
When I was in college, I was involved in a gaming group that played miniatures every month or so. Within that group, I gained something of a reputation as not being very good on the offense, not knowing how to handle cavalry very well, but a solid commander of Infantry formations, and a nightmare to attack.
One of the last games I played was a simulation of Waterloo. My position was on the Ally's Right Flank. My job was to keep the French from getting over the high ground behind the farm (La Hay Sante if I recall correctly). But Wellington (the person playing him at any rate) decided to conduct an "economy of force" operation there. To that date, no attacker over six years of play had ever taken a position from me. Sometimes there was nothing left on my side at the end of the battle, but the enemy would not succeed in taking the position. So Wellington allocated just four battalions of Foot, and a few companies of riflemen to my sector. These would begin the battle with one battalion in the farm, the rifle companies in the sandpits to the left of the farm (as I looked at the battlefield), and my remaining three battalions arrayed on the rise well back from the farm.
Napoleon (the player playing him) allocated six battalions of foot, two regiments of Cuirassiers, and three batteries to the sector.
Observing the situation, I immediately started one of my three battalions on the heights down the slope to reinforce the farm.
The French began bombarding the farm, and simply annihilated the rifle companies in the pits (there was nothing I could do about it, that was where they started).
The bombardment of the farm was so fierce, that the troops there were driven to cover, i.e., the farm was "suppressed".
With this accomplishment, the two cuirassier regiments rode around the farm and threatened to charge the battalion marching to reinforce it. This forced the battalion to halt its advance and form square.
With the farm suppressed, the French infantry now advanced, with five battalions bypassing the farm on the Right (as I looked at it), intending to destroy the battalion trapped in square, while the sixth battalion turned to attack and take the farm (outnumbering the survivors of the battalion there two-to-one).
Since the farm was suppressed, and about to be stormed and taken by the sixth battalion, the other five battalions, advancing in a single dense column on a five battalion front, did not bother to deploy screening forces between themselves and the farm. Victory was assured; the British forces would be defeated in detail by the French masses. The farm could not stand before the assault, the battalion held in square could not retreat for fear of being overrun by the Cuirassiers, and could not remain in square or they would be annihilated by the advancing French Infantry. The two British battalions at the top of the rise could not intervene in what was about to happen.
As the three French batteries limbered up to follow the advance, couriers were dispatched to Napoleon by the French General-de-Division commanding the sector to announce his victory, and that he would soon be rolling up the Allied Right Flank.
At that juncture, as the French 6th Battalion started mounting the walls of the farm, the Garrison badly shot up as it was, counter-attacked. Met by screaming British soldiers at the walls, the 6th Battalion recoiled back on itself, its formation shattered, and the men broke fleeing desperately to the rear. The Garrison now lined the wall facing south (towards the advancing French infantry column), and unleashed disciplined platoon volleys into the exposed flank. As some officers and non-commissioned officers tried to keep the column moving, others tried to deploy against the fire from the farm. Confusion spreading through the column at this sudden turn of events led to panic, and the entire column collapsed into a disorganized mob running pel-mel back where they had come from. The just limbered guns and their crews were swept along in the panic-stricken retreat.
The French Cuirassiers suddenly found themselves exposed to their left rear to a suddenly active Allied Defense position. If they held their position, threatening the one British battalion, fire from the farm would cut them to pieces. If they charged, they would not break the square and would sustain losses to no good purpose. While not broken on morale like the foot and guns were, the Cuirassiers had no choice but to fall back.
The British Square reformed into column and marched down, reinforcing the farm, and one of the two remaining British Battalions at the top of the rise began its own march down to the farm. (The farm could only hold one and a half battalions of troops at a time. It was probable that by the time this battalion arrived, assuming the French could get reorganized, casualties from bombardment would once again have made room for the extra troops, as they had for the first battalion that had started marching when the battle began).
As a final statement that the position had been held, a platoon of British Light Troops was sent out from the farm to reoccupy the untenable sandpits.
The lesson learned?
Had the French Commander deployed a screen of skirmishers to protect the flank of his five battalion column, even had the French 6th Battalion routed like it did, he would have had time to deploy another battalion to take the farm. His assumption that the farm not only must fall, but also would fall to the 6th battalion, invited brother Murphy to visit him and Murphy did so with a vengeance. It simply never occurred to him that the garrison would counterattack, which in turn forced a morale check, or that it would be the 6th battalion that had to make that check, and would fail it catastrophically. By not taking a rudimentary precaution, he allowed an aggressive defender to seize an opportunity, which initiated the subsequent catastrophic chain of events.
posted by Federation Commander at 1:39 PM
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