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Thursday, March 31, 2011

LEE, PICKET, AND THE THIRD DAY

Steve Cole observes:

Was Robert E. Lee stupid to launch Pickett's Charge on the third day at Gettysburg? His detractors, determined to prove that the man was just stupid, claim so, but the facts paint a more complicated picture. The fact is that the attack very nearly worked. The attack reached and penetrated the Union line, but ran out of combat power at the critical moment.

1. Pickett's Charge was part of a larger plan, including the seizure of Culp's Hill (the south held half of it at the end of the second day, but the north took that back early on the third) and on a cavalry attack behind the Union lines (which failed). Lee knew about Culp's Hill (but didn't have time to set up a different plan) but not the cavalry failure. Had either of those worked, the attack would have worked.

2. Lee was counting on the massive artillery barrage, and had no way to know until months later that most of it had gone over the heads of the Union infantry, just plain missing them. At the time the attack started, he assumed that the barrage had devastated the Union line (because the Union artillery stopped firing to conserve ammunition). Had the barrage been on target, the attack would have worked.

3. The fence halfway from where the charge started to the Union lines was much more substantial than anyone realized, and caused the attack to stop at the critical range of the Union guns. Many of the troops sent on this attack went no further as the crowd of wounded soldiers, those trying to get over the fence, and those who had lost heart because of the fence and the casualties. The fence broke the momentum of the charge. Without that fence, the attack would have worked.

4. Lee had put the attack into the hands of Longstreet, who did not want to make it. Longstreet paid little attention to how the attack was set up (the left flank brigades had been shot up on previous days and had no business being there, and promptly collapsed at the worst time). Longstreet also ignored Lee's commands to form and send a second wave including the divisions of Anderson and McLaws. Had that second wave been sent, the attack would have worked.

5. Lee had few alternatives. Standing on the defensive would have wasted a day. (Meade wasn't going to attack anything. Half of his brigades were no longer capable of combat.) Shifting troops to attack one flank or the other would have taken time. To his discredit, Lee was fixated on the point of the Union line where his second day attack had broken down.

Now, the definition of "worked" would have been "two-thirds of the Union Army is forced to retreat and the other third is captured". Not a war-winner (Meade's remaining troops were enough to stop Lee from going anywhere), but definitely a major victory on northern soil.